“Russian Fascism” is, on one hand, a well-established analytical term used to describe late Putinism, particularly since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. On the other hand, this equation is globally insufficient, no matter how convincing the parallels between Putinism and fascism may appear in specific instances. The aim of my investigation is to capture and analyze these inconsistencies using the heuristic concept of non-synchronicity (Ungleichzeitigkeit). This approach seems particularly promising, as one of the central sources for this concept—Ernst Bloch’s collection of essays Heritage of Our Times (Erbschaft dieser Zeit)—engages directly with historical fascism.
Three aspects of Putinism as fascism will be examined in this project through the lens of non-synchronicity. First, the political or systemic aspect of Putinism. Unlike “classical” historical fascisms, late Putinism is distinguished by its character as an “inverted totalitarianism” (Wolin 2003). While interwar fascism, in its ideal type, was staged as a mass movement “from below,” the shift from authoritarianism to quasi-totalitarianism in the Russian Federation was orchestrated “from above.”
The second aspect explores the reception lines of the historical Russian fascism after 1917 (such as the All-Russian Fascist Party in Manchuria during the 1930s–40s) within Putinism as an “unresolved residuum” (Bloch 1985, 51) of official historiography.
This unresolved historical trauma leads to the third aspect, namely ressentiment. Putinism is marked by ressentiment for its aggressive fantasies of superiority are often accompanied by self-victimization. Like the Global Right, Putinism shares the belief that it has been treated unfairly and considers its aggression as a justified response.
(image: Banner of the Russian Orthodox Fascists, in: Горячкин, Ф. Т. Первый русский фашист Петр Аркадьевич Столыпин / Ф. Т. Горячкин. – Харбин : Тип. “Меркурий”, 1928.)